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Abstract
This paper studies the semi-parametric identification and estimation of a rational
inattention model with Bayesian persuasion. The identification requires the observation
of a cross-section of market-level outcomes. The empirical content of the model can be
characterized by three moment conditions. A two-step estimation procedure is proposed
to avoid computation complexity in the structural model. In the empirical application,
I study the persuasion effect of Fox News in the 2000 presidential election. Welfare
analysis shows that persuasion will not influence voters with high school education but
will generate higher dispersion in the welfare of voters with a partial college education
and decrease the dispersion in the welfare of voters with a bachelors degree.
∗First draft: 03/22/2019. This version: 09/16/2020. I would like to thank Marc Henry, Sun Jae Jun,
Peter Newberry, Karl Schurter, Jia Xiang, Zhiyuan Chen and conference attenders at the 2019 Econometric
Society Asian Meeting for useful comments.
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1 Introduction
In many applications of discrete choice models, econometricians usually assume the decision
maker has the following random utility from choosing item j among a choice set J = 1, ...J :
Uj = uj + j, where uj is the mean utility observed by the econometricians and j is the
utility shock known to the decision maker but not the econometrician. Decision makers in
the model choose the item with the highest utility. When the unobserved shock follows the
Type I extreme value distribution, we can solve the probability of choosing j analytically.
Aggregating the choice outcomes of the decision makers in the market we can get the market
share of an item. This approach to studying market structure was initiated by McFadden
(1973), and then adopted by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (henceforth BLP) to study
automobile markets, and became widely applied to other industries.
This model, however, is not easily adaptable to accommodate persuasion in a structural
way. Take advertising as a form of persuasion. In the classical analysis of the effect of
advertising, three approaches are adopted. The first is to model advertising as a feature of the
item that enters mean utility uj = uj(A), where the level of advertising A affects the choice
utility. The argument is that advertising is ‘persuasive’ and the individual will buy more
of the advertised goods because their utility is distorted (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954). This
reduced form approach does not offer us much explanation of how advertisement influences
decision making and market structure. The second approach is to model advertisement
as the trigger of the consideration set change (Goeree, 2008). The consideration set is
the priori set of items that the decision maker chooses from. Advertisement thus serves
as the trigger that puts a previously non-considered item into the consideration set. This
approach views advertisement as the information revealing device that reveals the true j
to the decision maker which was previously −∞ to the decision maker. If a good j is
already in the consideration set for all customers, the model of consideration set predicts
that advertising has no effect on the market share. If a good is well known, the model
of consideration set cannot explain why sellers advertise. The third approach is to view
advertising as a signaling device to separate the high-quality product from the low-quality
product (Nelson, 1974; Bagwell and Ramey, 1988). The degree of advertisement serves as
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the signal that induces the separating equilibrium where only high-quality firms advertise. In
particular, they assume the unobserved quality is common for all decision makers. However,
this approach requires the decision maker in the model to have imperfect knowledge of j,
which contradicts the assumption that j is known by the decision maker.
Compared to the classical approaches to model persuasion, this paper develops an empir-
ical model of persuasion using the Bayesian persuasion theory in Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). The Bayesian persuasion approach to model advertising differs from the previously
mentioned informative view in two ways: 1. Decision makers in the model can have a differ-
ent realization of the product quality; 2. The advertiser, who acts as the Bayesian persuader,
does not always want to reveal their quality honestly. However, similar to the informative
view, the Bayesian persuasion model assumes that the decision maker in the model only has
a prior belief on the {j}Jj=1 and the exact realization of {j}Jj=1 is unknown. The decision
maker’s prior distribution of {j}Jj=1 comes from the reputation of the goods. The prior belief
is likely to be common across decision makers. However, the standard Bayesian persuasion
model assumes the decision makers only have access to the signal sent by the persuader
to update their belief and no other sources of information are available. In the real world,
decision makers will also search actively for information on the goods’ quality by themselves.
For example, if a person wants to buy a car, he or she will have a test drive before making
a decision. An extensive search of information can reduce the randomness of {j}Jj=1 but at
the time is costly. Matejka and McKay (2015) considers a model where the decision maker
searches information of {j}Jj=1 to maximize the expected utility after deducting the search
cost. Their rational inattention discrete choice model can incorporate Bayesian persuasion
by assuming persuaders send signals after the decision makers get their own information.
The analysis of the structural persuasion and information search model has largely been
discussed under the assumption that the decision makers’ prior belief of {j}Jj=1, denoted
by G, is known to the economist. In empirical researches, the prior belief G is unknown
and should be estimated from data. A recent empirical study by Xiang (2020) assumes
the decision makers’ prior distribution G is normally distributed and analyzes the decision
makers’ welfare change when a policy change induces the persuader to change the persuasion
strategy. However, the empirical content of a parametric assumption on G is unclear.
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This paper follows Matejka and McKay (2015) to consider a rational inattention dis-
crete model with Bayesian persuasion. I discuss the non-parametric identification of the
prior distribution G and parametric identification of persuader’s persuasion strategy when
an econometrician observes the choice ratio at the market level across many independent
markets. The independent markets are divided into two groups: the first group is not in-
fluenced by the persuader and the second group is influenced by the persuader. The prior
distribution G is identified from the choice ratio in the first group of markets. Given the
identification of G, a parametric persuasion strategy is identified from the second group of
markets. I characterize a set of moment conditions implied by the model, and the standard
estimation method such as GMM can be applied easily.
For econometricians who already observe the market shares with and without the in-
fluence of persuasion, identifying the persuasion strategy is the first step to understanding
the behavior of the persuader. If we assume the persuader use a persuasion strategy is to
maximize some utility function, the identified persuasion strategy can help us understand
the persuader’s objective function. Analysis in this paper leaves the persuader’s objective
function as unknown and analyzes the behavior from the buyers’ side. A complete two-sided
analysis will incorporate the persuader’s utility as a function of persuasion strategy and
analyze the problem as a sequential game played between the persuader and the buyers.
For policymakers, given the knowledge of the prior belief G, they will be able to evaluate
the effect of regulating the persuasion strategy. In the advertisement market, the policymak-
ers for example can ban one seller from directly revealing information about his competitors’
products. Moreover, policymakers can also evaluate the effect of providing less costly in-
formation to the decision makers. In other words, policymakers can compete with existing
persuaders in the markets to increase the decision makers’ welfare.
In the empirical application, I look at the 2000 presidential election in the United States.
I treat the presidential candidates as voters’ choices and view voting statistical areas as
separated markets. In 1996, Fox News was developed and then entered into approximately
30% of the towns in the United States by 2000. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) shows that
Fox News motivated voters to vote for Republicans compared to voters in towns without
Fox News. I take the data and analyze how Fox News persuaded voters in different towns.
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The estimated results from the markets without Fox News show that the prior belief of
the quality of the presidential candidates varies a lot with voters’ education level. Both
voters with bachelor’s degrees and with only high school degrees prefer the Democratic party
than the Republican Party. The estimated results also show that Fox News provided very
little information to voters, but managed to manipulate the voting outcome by a significant
margin. I also compare the welfare of voters with different education levels. Voters’ welfare is
defined as the probability of choosing their first best choice, and their first best choice is the
presidential candidate that will generate the highest utility to voters when the voters know
the realization of {j}Jj=1. The result shows that persuasion will not influence the welfare of
voters with high school education but will generate higher dispersion in the welfare of voters
with a partial college education and decrease the dispersion in the welfare of voters with a
bachelors degree.
Another way to study the effect of persuasion is to model the presence of a persuader
as a treatment status (Jun and Lee, 2018). In their model, the presence of a Bayesian
persuader is taken as treatment assignment and sharp bounds on the persuasion effect are
given under various data generating processes. The treatment effect model does not specify
the decision makers’ utility and thus analysis of the decision makers’ welfare before and after
persuasion is not possible. The treatment effect model also makes it hard to consider policy
counterfactual such as regulations on persuasion strategy or when the policymaker provides
extra information in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the rational inattention
discrete choice model with persuasion. Section 3 discusses the data generating process and
the identification strategy. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 5 studies the
2000 presidential election and the effect of Fox News. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider the standard random utility specification: a decision maker (DM) derives utility
level Uj from good j from the choice set J = {1, ..., J}:
Uj = uj + j.
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The uj is the mean utility of choosing good j and j is the individual specific random draw
of utility shock. Throughout this section, I assume that the decision maker knows only
(u1, ..., uj) but not (1, ...J). The decision maker has a prior belief on the distribution G on
the utility shock: (1, ...J) ≡  ∼ G. If there is no further information about the true utility
shock , the decision maker will choose the one with highest expected utility:
j ∈ a(G) ≡ arg max
j∈J
EG[uj + j]. (2.1)
If arg maxj∈J EG[uj + j] is not a singleton, we let a(G) to be an arbitrary selection of
maximizers. The maximized utility derived from the belief G is given by
V (G) ≡ max
j∈J
EG[uij + ij]. (2.2)
I will first introduce a rational inattention discrete choice model and then discuss how
persuasion can be incorporated.
2.1 Rational Inattention Discrete Choice Model
The rational inattention discrete choice model in Matejka and McKay (2015) assumes that
the decision maker can choose an information strategy to get a signal sDM . The signal sDM
updates the decision makers’ belief on the true utility shock . The decision maker then
choose the item with highest posterior mean according to (2.1). Following the notation in
Matejka and McKay (2015), denote uj + j ≡ vj. Formally, the decision maker’s information
strategy is a joint distribution of the true utility vector v ∈ RJ and the signal sDM ∈ RJ ,
denoted by F (sDM ,v). The marginal distribution of the information strategy has to be
consistent with the prior belief G. Once the decision maker is committed to the information
strategy, the random shocks to utility are realized, and then the decision maker get a realized
signal sDM from F (sDM |v). The decision maker updates his belief as F (|sDM), and chooses
the item in a(F (|sDM)) according to (2.1).
Since the real utility shocks are not observed by the decision maker, the decision maker
solves the following optimization problem to maximize his expected utility:
max
F∈∆(R2J )
∫
v
∫
sDM
V (F (·|sDM))F (dsDM |v)G(dv)− c(F ) (2.3)
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s.t.
∫
sDM
F (dsDM ,v) = G(v) (2.4)
where V (F (·|sDM)) is determined by (2.2). The constraint (2.4) requires that the DM’s prior
distribution G is consistent with the real state of the world. The cost of information c(F ) is
the mutual information between the shocks  and the signal sDM :
c(F ) = λ{H(G)− Es[H(F (·|sDM))]}, (2.5)
where the parameter λ is the unit cost of information, and Es denote the expectation over
the marginal distribution of F (sDM ,v). The entropy function H of a discrete distribution G
is defined as:H(G) = −∑k Pk log(Pk), where Pk is the probability of the state k. When G is
continuously distributed, the differential entropy is defined as H(G) = − ∫
s
g(s) log(g(s))ds.
The use of entropy reduction as a measure of information cost is standard in the rational
inattention literature. See De Oliveira et al. (2017) for the discussion of entropy cost. More-
over, the entropy number is related to the complexity of a random variable, and can be given
a data compression interpretation. The mutual information in (2.5) can be interpreted as
the number of binary questions asked by acquiring signal s. Appendix A gives an example
of data compression interpretation.
Let SDMj ≡ {sDM ∈ RJ : a(F (·|sDM) = j} be the set of signals that lead the DM to
choose j. Also denote
Pj(v) ≡
∫
SDMj
F (dsDM |v) (2.6)
as the conditional choice probability of choosing item j when the realized utility vector is v
1. Also define the unconditional choice probability of choosing j as
P0j =
∫
v
Pj(v)dG(v). (2.7)
This is the ex-ante probability of choosing j before the utility vector is realized.
A set of optimality condition to the problem (2.3)-(2.5) from Matejka and McKay (2015)
is summarized in the following lemma.
1Note that the DM does not know the realization of v. The conditional choice probability should be
understood to be the choice probability when the actual utility vector is v
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Lemma 2.1. If λ>0 and F is an optimal information strategy that solves (2.3)-(2.5), then
the conditional and choice probability in (2.6) satisfies
Pj(v) =
P0j evj/λ∑
k∈J P0kevk/λ
a.s., (2.8)
EG[Pj(v)] = P0j . (2.9)
The unconditional choice probability in (2.7) solves the following convex optimization prob-
lem:
max
{P0j }Jj=1
∫
v
λ log(
J∑
j=1
P0j evj/λ)G(dv)
s.t. ∀j : P0j ≥ 0,
J∑
k=1
P0k = 1.
(2.10)
Conversely, if {P0j }Jj=1 is the solution to (2.10), and Pj(v) defined in (2.8) satisfies (2.9),
then we can construct an information strategy F such that:
• The signal sDM is supported on J points: {s1, ...sJ};
• The conditional distribution of sDM satisfies PrF (sDM = sj) = Pj(v).
This information strategy F solves the optimization problem (2.3)-(2.5).
Proof. See Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 in Matejka and McKay (2015).
Lemma 2.1 shows that solving the optimization problem (2.3)-(2.5) is equivalent to solve
the optimization problem (2.10). We do not observe the DM’s optimal information strategy.
Instead, we observe their choice outcome. When we aggregate the choice outcome to the
market level, it becomes the conditional and unconditional choice probability.
We should note that the conditional choice probability (2.8) takes a Logit-like choice
probability form. However, the rational inattention discrete choice model does not imply the
usual I.I.A constraints on the choice probability. Matejka and McKay (2015) discusses the
two equivalent conditions on the conditional choice probability (2.8).
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2.2 A Sequential Persuasion Game
Consider a persuader that tries to influence the choice probability by choosing a persuasion
strategy and sending a realized signal. The persuader is also called he information designer
(ID) in the Bayesian persuasion literature.
Definition 1. A persuasion strategy is a joint distribution F˜ (sID,v) of the signal sID ∈ RJ
sent by the ID and the utility vector such that∫
F˜ (sID,v)dsID = G(v).
I consider a sequential persuasion game between the decision makers and the information
designer in the following order
1. The information designer chooses an persuasion strategy and then sends the realized
signal sID to the decision maker;
2. The decision maker updates his belief to the intermediate distribution:
G˜sID ≡ G˜(v|SID = sID) = G(v)× F˜ (s
ID|v)∫
v
F˜ (v, s)dv
; (2.11)
3. The decision maker solves optimization (2.3)-(2.5) with the intermediate belief G˜sID ;
4. The decision maker gets a realized signal sDM from his optimal information strategy
F . He then makes the choice based on the updated belief F (v|sDM).
For the persuasion strategy to work, it is assumed that the DM who receives the signal
knows the joint distribution F˜ (sID,v).
Assumption 2.1. The persuasion strategy F˜ (sID,v) is common knowledge.
The assumption 2.1 on F˜ is satisfied when there is an underlying equilibrium determin-
ing how the information designer chooses the persuasion strategy. For example, information
designer can have an objective function M : ∆(R2J) → R so that F˜ = arg maxF∈CM(F )
where C ⊂ ∆(R2J) is some constrained persuasion strategy set. When the objective function
M and the constrained set C is known by the DM, the decision maker can solve the informa-
tion designer’s optimization problem to get F˜ . This paper does not tackle the information
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designer’s objective function. The objective function for the information designer is not easy
to formulate. In the marketing context, the trade-off is between higher marketing cost of
persuasion and higher sales. In the context of political persuasion, the goal of persuasion is
not to maximize voting share but to increase voting share until it exceeds 50%. Also, the
media that conducts persuasion may also care about other aspects of persuasion since their
persuasion strategy can influence their audience ratings.
The setting of the persuasion game is different from the setting in Bloedel and Segal
(2018). In their setting, the decision maker chooses an information strategy to understand
the signal send by the sender. In other words, the decision maker in their model pays
attention cost to understand the signal from the sender and cannot acquire a signal about
the true utility by himself. In my formulate, there is no cost to understand the signal sID
from the sender and there is a cost incurred by acquiring information about the true utility
vector.
Remark 2.1. The persuasion strategy F˜ and the information strategy F lie in the same
space. The effect of persuasion is limited because decision makers can acquire their own
information. While the ID can distort the prior distribution of the utility vector v through
F˜ , the decision maker’s information strategy F (sDM ,v) can still provide information to the
decision maker.
3 Identification
In this section, I discuss a data generating process that allows us to non-parametrically
identify the prior belief G and parametrically identify the persuasion strategy F˜ . To allow
for the heterogeneity of decision makers’ preferences, I assume the utility of an individual i
in market m in the demographic group k takes the following additively separable form:
Uikjm = u1(x
m
j , β) + u2(x
m
j , νik, α) + j,m, (3.1)
where xmj is the characteristics of product j in market m; k is the index for people of
demographic group k with demographic characteristics νik; m is the index for market. The
utility function u1, u2 is of known parametric form, and α, β are two vectors to be estimated,
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but the distribution of G is left as non-parametric. The utility (3.1) assumes that the decision
makers’ demographic and product characteristics only influence their mean utility but not
the utility shocks. Here I assume that all DMs in the same market m realize the same
m = (1m, ..., jm) since the random shock vector m in equation (3.1) does not depend on
the individual index i. In particular, if individual i1 and i2 are in the same market, and they
have the same demographic characteristics, they should have the same realized utility vector.
This specification is reasonable when the shock is market-specific. For example, when we
want to study the voting decision, the market realization of m can be the real payoff of
candidate j’s policy on town m’s local industry. In the automobile industry, this market
level states of the world may come from the local road condition, climate, or geographic
topology.
Notation
Throughout this section, I use ·˜ to denote probability quantities related to markets with the
presence of a persuader. Also, I drop the super-scrip on sID, and use s to denote signals sent
by the information designer whenever there is no confusion. I use m to denote the index for
markets, j to denote the index of products, k to denote the index of different demographic
groups.
3.1 Data Generating Process
In many data sets, we do not observe individual choices. Instead, we observe the market
share, which is the aggregated individual choices. Across different markets, I assume that
the prior distribution on j,m is the same G.
Assumption 3.1. (Data) (i) We observe a binary variable χm such that χm = 1 if and
only if the persuader is present in market m; (ii). The demographic heterogeneity vk is
discrete and supported on K points. For each market m, the distribution of demographic
heterogeneity Dm = (dm1 , ..., dmK) is observed, where dmk is the proportion of DMs in group k
in market m; (iii). We observe the market characteristics Xm in each market m and the
market share vector msm = (msm1 , ...,msmJ ), where msmj is the market share of product j.
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The following is the assumption on the markets where there is no persuader.
Assumption 3.2. (DGP without Persuasion) For markets with χm = 0, the data generating
process satisfies:
1. Common prior: m ∼ G;
2. Independent random utility shock: m ⊥ Xm
3. Independent demographic distribution: Dm ⊥ (m,Xm)
4. The choice set J and information cost λ are the same across different markets.
Assumption 3.2 imposes that the mean of m is independent of the product characteristics
and is normalized to be zero. If there is any unobserved characteristics that is correlated
with Xmj , the unobserved effects are captured by the observed Xmj .
For markets with a persuader, I assume that the persuader is the same across these
markets and the persuader use the same persuasion strategy. Moreover, I assume that the
persuasion strategy is a joint distribution of m and sID. This specification is different
from Definition 1 and the persuader uses the same persuasion strategy even if the product
characteristics Xmj may vary across markets.
Assumption 3.3. (DGP with Persuasion) For markets with χm = 1, the data generating
process satisfies:
1. (, Xmj , Dm) and (λ,J ) satisfy the conditions in Assumption 3.2;
2. There is a uniform persuader across markets with χm = 1 and the persuasion strategy
F˜ k(sID, ) can depend on the demographic groups k but not the market;
3. The persuasion signal sIDkm ∼ F˜ k(sID|m) and the signal sIDkm is independent of each
other across demographic groups and markets;
4. Signal Independence (sIDk , m) ⊥ Dm.
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Normalization
Since the permutation of the item index does not matter, I call the last item J the outside
option. Note that in the discrete choice model, only the relative difference of utility matters
for the DM. Therefore, we can normalize the utility of outside option J to be zero UkJ = 0.
Also, when u1, u2 is homogeneous of degree one with respect to α, β, the vector (α, β, λ,G)
is not identified. Indeed, we can consider a model with (cα, cβ, cλ, cG), where cG is the
distribution of cm. The model (cα, cβ, cλ, cG) will generate the same choice probability
(2.6 and (2.7). Since linear specification of utility is frequently used in the applied literature,
I assume u1, u2 is homogeneous of degree one with respect to α, β.
Assumption 3.4. (Normalization) The utility functions u1, u2 are homogeneous of degree 1
with respect to (α, β), and λ = 1.
3.2 The Identified Set
The parameters of interests include the mean utility parameters (α, β), the prior belief G,
and the persuasion strategy F˜ . For markets without persuasion, we are also interested
in P0,kj (X), which is demographic group k’s unconditional choice probability of choosing j
when the product characteristics are X. If we want to evaluate the overall effect of persuasion
across different markets, we want to compare the post-persuasion market share with P0,kj (X).
I first define the identified set of (α, β,G,P0,kj (X)) from the rational inattention discrete
choice model.
Definition 2. Let Fχ=0 denote the conditional distribution of (Dm,Xm,msm) conditioned
on χm = 0. The identified set of (α, β,G,P0,kj (X)) under the rational inattention discrete
choice model, denoted by ΓI , is the collection of (α, β, {P0,kj (X)}j,k, G) that satisfies the
following constraints:
1. Given (α, β,G), {P0,kj (X)}j,k solves the individuals optimization problem (2.10) with
vmj = u1(x
m
j , β) + u2(x
m
j , νik, α) + 
m
j ; (3.2)
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2. The unconditional mean of the conditional choice probability is the unconditional choice
probability:
EG
[
P0,kj (X)ev
m
j /λ∑
k∈J P0,kj (X)evmk /λ
]
= P0,kj (X); (3.3)
3. Consider the mapping:
Pmj (α, β, , Dm,Xm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k) =
∑
k
dmk
P0,kj (X)ev
m
j /λ∑
k∈J P0,kj (X)evmk /λ
(3.4)
where vmj is defined in (3.2). Then (Dm, Xmj ,Pmj (α, β, , Dm,Xm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k)) has
the same distribution as Fχ=0.
The first two conditions in Definition 2 corresponds to the optimization condition (2.10)
and the condition (2.9) in Lemma 2.1. Equation (3.4) calculates the market share of product
j as the weighted average of different demographic groups’ choice probability. The third
condition in Definition 2 requires the model predicted market share is consistent with the
observed data distribution.
I then define the identified set of the persuasion strategy F˜ .
Definition 3. Let Fχ=1 denote the conditional distribution of (Dm,Xm,msm) conditioned
on χm = 1. Given the value of (α, β,G), and a persuasion strategy F˜ , we consider the map:
P˜kj,s(; Xm) =
P˜0,kj,s (Xm)ev
m
j∑J
l=1 P˜
0,k
l,s (X
m)ev
m
j
(3.5)
where P˜0,kj,s (Xm) solves the individual optimization problem (2.10) when his belief is G˜() =
F˜ (|sID = s). The identified set of the persuasion strategy is the set of F˜ (sID, ) such that(
Dm,Xm,
∑
k
dmk P˜kj,s(; Xm)
)
has the same distribution as Fχ=1.
The identified set in Definition 3 is conditioned on the vector (α, β,G). This is because in
markets with the persuader, there are two types of the unobserved heterogeneity: the utility
shock m and the realization of the signal sID. In contrast, in markets without the persuader,
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only the utility shock m exists. Therefore, knowing the prior distribution G reduces the
randomness and makes the problem of identifying the persuasion strategy tractable.
The identified set of (α, β,G) in Definition 2 is defined through the rational inattention
discrete choice model only, and it ignores the empirical content of the subsequent persuasion
stage. There are two reasons to define the identified set in this way. First, if we only have
data on markets without any persuader, i.e. χm = 0 for all markets, the identified set
defined in Definition 2 can still be used. Second, the unobserved persuasion signal sID in the
persuasion stage makes it hard to characterize the empirical content of the whole persuasion
game. I will stick with these two definitions and characterize the corresponding moment
conditions.
3.3 Moment Equality Model
Recall that given (α, β) and the unconditional choice probability {P0,kj (X)}j,k, the model
predicted market share is given by (3.4). Following BLP, I denote δmj = u1(xmj , β) + mj and
let δm = (δm1 , ..., δmJ ). Then the predicted market share in (3.4) can be written as:
Pmj (α, β, , Dm,Xm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k) =
∑
k
P0,kj (Xm)eδ
m
j +u2(x
m
j ,νk,α)
P0,kJ (Xm) +
∑J−1
l=1 P0,kl (Xm)eδml +u2(xml ,νk,α)
dmk
≡ ms∗j(Xm, δm, α,Dm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k),
where the utility of the outside option is normalized to zero, so δmJ = u2(xmJ , νk, α) = 0.
Consider a mapping T : RJ−1 → RJ−1 such that[
T [Xm,msm, α,Dm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k](δm)
]
j
= δj+log(ms
m
j )− log(ms∗j (Xm, δj , α,Dm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k)), (3.6)
where [T ]j is the j-th entry in the output vector. The inputmsm will be the observed market
share. When T (δm) = δm, the observed market share msm equals the model predicted
market share. This map is a contraction mapping whenever the outside option has a nonzero
unconditional choice probability. As a result, there exists a unique market level δm that
matches the observed market share with the model predicted market share.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose in a market we have ms0J > 0, then the mapping defined by (3.6) is a
contraction mapping. Let δ∗m denote the fixed point of the contraction mapping (3.6). As a
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result, the unobserved heterogeneity δ∗m is a function of observables xm, Dk, msm and the
parameters α and P 0,kj (X).
Now I state the first identification result of the prior distribution G.
Proposition 1. For each (α, β, {P0,kj (X)}j,k) in the identified set ΓI defined in Definition
2, there exists a unique G∗ such that (α, β,G∗, {P0,kj (X)}j,k) ∈ ΓI . In particular, for any
measurable set B, define the set
MS(B;xm, Dk,ms
m, α, P 0,kj (X), β) ≡ {msm : δ∗m(xm, Dm,msm, α, P 0,kj (X))− [u1(xmj , β)]Jj=1 ∈ B},
where δ∗m is defined in Lemma 3.1 and [u1(xmj , β)]Jj=1 = [u1(xm1 , β), ..., u1(xmJ , β)]′. The G∗
satisfies
PrG∗(
m ∈ B) = PrFχ=0(msm ∈MS(B; xm, Dk,msm, α, P 0,kj (X), β)). (3.7)
Proof. I prove this statement by contradiction. Suppose there exists a G′ 6= G∗ such that
(α, β,G′, {P0,kj (X)}j,k) is also in the identified set. Suppose there exists a positively measured
set B′ such that
PrG∗(
m ∈ B′) 6= PrG′(m ∈ B′).
I claim the distribution of msm implied by G′, denoted by F ′χ=0 is different from Fχ=0. By
equation (3.4),
PrF ′χ=0(ms
m ∈MS(B′; xm, Dk,msm, α, P 0,kj (X), β))
= PrG′(
m ∈ B′)
6= PrG∗(m ∈ B′)
= PrFχ=0(ms
m ∈MS(B′; xm, Dk,msm, α, P 0,kj (X), β)).
Therefore, G′ cannot generate the same data distribution Fχ=0, so G′ is not in the identified
set by Definition 2.
Proposition 1 states that once we know (α, β, {P0,kj (X)}j,k), the distribution G is point
identified. This is similar to the identification strategy in the first price auction models
(Guerre et al., 2000). The δ∗m − [u1(xmj , β)]Jj=1 is the pseudo value of m, similar to the
pseudo value that is constructed from bids in the auction model.
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Proposition 2. Suppose assumptions 3.2, 3.4. Suppose the unconditional choice probability
{P0,kj (X)}j,k are uniformly bounded away from zero and one. Each (α, β, {P0,kj (X)}j,k, G) in
the identified set ΓI defined in Definition 2 satisfies:
1. Constraint on unconditional choice probability:
E
msm −

P0,11 (Xm) ... P0,K1 (Xm)
... ... ...
P0,1J (Xm) ... P0,KJ (X)m


dm1
...
dmK

∣∣∣∣∣(Dm),Xm
 = 0; (3.8)
2. Instrument constraint:
E[δ∗j (ms
m,Xm, Dm, α, {P0,kj (X)}j,k)− u1(Xmj , β)|Xm, Dm] = 0, ∀j = 1, ..., J − 1;
(3.9)
3. Optimality constraint on {P0,kj (X)}j,k ∀ j = 1, 2, ..J − 1 k = 1, ..., K:
E
[
eδ
m
j +u2(x
m
j ,νk,α)∑
l∈J P0,kl (X)eδml +u2(xml ,νk,α)
− 1
∣∣∣∣Xm] = 0; (3.10)
4. G satisfies equation (3.7).
The first moment equality (3.8) is equivalent to condition (3.3) in Definition 2, since
msm is the conditional choice probability while P0,kj is the unconditional choice probability.
The second moment inequality (3.9) is the consequence of conditions 2 and 3 in Assumption
3.2. The third moment inequality is the first order condition of (2.10).
Remark 3.1. The identification results are different from the results in BLP in several
ways. First, we need the number of markets to be large to identify the unconditional choice
probability for different demographic groups from (3.8). From the identified unconditional
choice probability, we can proceed to identify coefficients on the product and demographic
heterogeneous characteristics α and β. Second, in BLP we assume there is a vector of
unobserved product heterogeneity ξ = (ξ1, ...ξJ) that can be recovered by matching market
shares and model prediction. In the rational inattention discrete choice model, we recover a
vector of market-specific utility shock . Third, the prior distribution of  is the structural
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object that we are interested in, but the distribution of ξ in BLP is not of fundamental
interest.
Remark 3.2. If the price of item j, denoted by qj, enters in the product heterogeneity Xj,
then the price is likely to be correlated with the unobserved market realized utility shock. For
example, when sellers know the realization of , they may set a price accordingly. In this
case, the assumption E[m|Xm] = 0 fails. In this case, we may want to find an instrument
for qj. The choice of instruments for the price is discussed in BLP.
Definition 3 of the identified set of persuasion strategy is conditioned on the value of
(β, α,G). If (β, α,G) is point identified from Proposition 2, we can assume that (β, α,G) is
known by the econometrician and plug the identified (β, α,G) into Definition 3. If (β, α,G)
is not point identified, we can do analysis by considering that each point in the identified set
ΓI as the true value separately.
For a point (α, β,G) in the identified set ΓI , equation (3.5) defines the conditional choice
probability of demographic group k choosing item j when they receive a persuasion signal s
from the ID. The P˜0,kj,s is the unconditional choice probability solved from (2.3)-(2.5) when
the intermediate belief is F˜ (|s). The choice probability P˜0,kj,s is conditioned on the signal
sID, but unconditional on the utility shock.
The observed market share m˜sm is a linear combination of different demographic groups’
conditional choice probability :
m˜smj = (P˜1j,s(,Xm), ...P˜Kj,s(,Xm))(dm1 , ..., dmK)′. (3.11)
Conditioned on (dm1 , ..., dmK), we can take expectation on both sides of (3.11) to get:
E[m˜sj − (P˜1j,s(,Xm), ...P˜Kj,s(,Xm))(dm1 , ..., dmK)′|Dm,Xm] = 0, ∀j = 1, ...J. (3.12)
Since we do not observe the realization of the persuasion signal and the realization of the
utility shock in each market, we can integrate it out. Let
hkj (X
m; F˜ k) :=
∫
(s,)
P˜kj,s(,Xm)dF˜ (s, )
=
∫
(s,)
P˜kj,s(,Xm)dF˜ (|s)dF˜ k(s)
=
∫
s
P˜0,kj,s (Xm)dF˜ k(s)
(3.13)
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be the unconditional choice probability for demographic group k under persuasion strategy
F˜ (s, ; θ). The third equality holds because G(|s; θ) = F˜ (|s; θ) by Bayes’ rule.
Proposition 3. Under assumption 3.2 - 3.3, for each (α, β,G), the true persuasion strategy
parameter θ0 must satisfy the moment condition
E[m˜sj −
K∑
k=1
hkj (X
m; F˜ )dmk |Dm,Xm] = 0 ∀j = 1...J − 1. (3.14)
Proof. By assumption 3.2, the independence of demographic distribution Dm and (m,Xm):
E[P˜kj,s(m,Xm)|Dm,Xm] = P˜0,kj,s (Xm).
Then by (3.12), we have
E[m˜sj − (P˜0,1j,s (Xm), ...P˜0,Kj,s (Xm))(dm1 , ..., dmK)′|Dm,Xm] = 0. (3.15)
Since the signal sID ⊥ Dm,Xm by assumption 3.3, we have E[P˜0,kj,s (Xm)|Dm,Xm] = hkj (Xm; F˜ ).
The result follows.
The effective number of conditional moment equality is J − 1 since I have the constraint
that
∑
m˜sj = 1. We should be careful with the persuasion strategy in Bayesian persuasion.
The value of a signal in persuasion strategy itself has no meaning beyond the context of a
communication game. For example, if F˜1 is the distribution of (, sID) and is the persuasion
strategy used by the persuader, then let F˜2 be the distribution of (, sID + ∆), where ∆ is
an arbitrary vector that lies in the same space as sID. F˜2 as a persuasion strategy is not
different from F˜1 since the value of the signal does not matter.
In practice, we can consider the case where the persuasion strategy is indexed by a finite-
dimensional parameter θ: F˜ k(sID, ; θ), and the support of sID is finite. The persuasion
strategy can depend on the demographic group k. There are several justifications for the
use of a parametric persuasion strategy. First, when there are only two choices, the optimal
persuasion strategy is to use a cut-off rule, see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2016). In this
case, the parameter θ is the cutoff points, and signals only take two values. Second, in
many empirical contexts, it is costly to design complex persuasion strategies. For example,
an online advertisement can only send a simple signal within a few seconds. If the cost of
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signal increase with the number of parameters and support points of signals, it is natural to
restrict the persuasion strategy to parametric form. Third, a parametric persuasion strategy
with discrete signal support facilitates a clear interpretation of the meaning of the signals.
In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), signals are interpreted as action recommendations.
Discussion of Moment Condition (3.14)
One issue with the moment condition (3.14) is that it does not guarantee the identification of
persuasion parameters θ. For example, consider the case where there is only one demographic
group K = 1 and no product characteristics heterogeneity across markets Xm = X ∀m. In
this case, moment condition (3.14) implies hj(F˜ ) = E[m˜sj]. If F˜ is indexed by a parameter
θ and hj(F˜ (θ)) is not monotone in θ, then θ is not necessarily point identified.
There are several restrictions that help to tighten the identified set of F˜ . The first is to
impose the persuasion strategy is the same for certain demographic groups, i.e. F˜ k(s|) =
F˜ k
′
(s|) for some k 6= k′. Then demographic variation will tighten the bounds on the
persuasion strategy. This is because different demographic groups’ choice probability can
have different sensitivity to the same persuasion strategy. The second is to impose the
parameter θ to be of lower dimension smaller than J . The variation of the choice probability
across different products can tighten the bounds of the parameter that indexes the persuasion
strategy. Third, the variation of product characteristics across markets can also tighten the
bounds on F˜ . This is because if in a market m the j-th product characteristics xmj generates
large utility to decision makers, persuasion strategy is unlikely to change the market share
a lot.
Point Identification Assumption
It is worthwhile to discuss the assumptions under which parameters (α, β,P0,kj , G) and θ are
point identified. Note that the moment conditions constructed in (3.8)- (3.10) are similar
to the moment conditions appeared in BLP, except that I have extra parameters P0,kj (X)
to identify. Note that the moment condition for P0,kj (X) is similar to the moment condition
for linear regression, so if E[FkF ′k|X] is invertible X − a.s., then P0,kj (X) is identified. The
global sufficient primitive conditions for identification of moment conditions (3.9)- (3.10) are
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not easy to interpret, because the fixed point δ∗ in Lemma 3.1 is highly non-linear in its
arguments. In a similar situation in BLP, they assume the moment conditions are sufficient
to identify the utility parameter.
Assumption 3.5. (Identification Assumption)
1. E[FkF ′k|X] is invertible, X− a.s .
2. At the true parameter {P0,kj (X)}j,k, there is a unique (α, β) such that moment condi-
tions (3.9) and (3.10) hold.
The second requirement in Assumption 3.5 is not as restrictive as it seems. In particular,
if there is only one demographic group, the fixed point in Lemma 3.1 is given by
δ∗j = log
msmj
msmJ
− log P
0
j (X
m)
P0J(Xm)
, (3.16)
and moment condition (3.9) becomes
E
[
log
msmj
msmJ
− log P
0
j (X
m)
P0J(Xm)
− u1(Xmj , β)
∣∣∣∣Xm] = 0.
If {P0,kj (X)}j,k is identified from moment condition 3.8 and u1 is a linear function, then β is
point identified.
Now suppose the persuasion is parametric and indexed by θ. The assumptions to guar-
antee that θ is identified up to (α, β,G)2 is easier to write down. The discussion of (3.14)
shows that hk,0j (xm) ≡ hkj (xm; θ0) is identified if E[DmDm′|X] is invertible, X − a.s, where
θ0 is the true value of θ. Then the identified set of the persuasion strategy is then the set of
the θ∗ such that hkj (x; θ∗) = h
k,0
j (x) for all j, k and x ∈ supp(X).
Assumption 3.6. The matrix E[DmDm′|X] is invertible for X− a.s..
4 Estimation
Under Assumption 3.5, (α, β,G, {P0j,k(X)}j,k) is point identified from moment conditions
(3.8), (3.9) and (3.10). When the product characteristics X are continuously distributed,
2We say θ is identified up to (α, β,G) if the data generating process allow us to point identify θ for each
given parameter (α, β,G).
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P0,kj (X) in moment condition (3.8) needs to be estimated non-parametrically. However, in
some empirical settings, the product characteristics are discrete and standard estimators of
moment equality such as GMM estimator can be implemented directly. In this section, I
discuss the estimation of (α, β,G, {P0j,k(X)}j,k) when the characteristics X are discrete.
Assumption 4.1. The product characteristics Xm are discretely distributed and supported
on L points: {x(1), ...x(L)}, and the probability inf l=1,...,L Pr(Xm = x(l)) > 1/C for some
constant C > 0.
Under Assumption 4.1, the analysis of moment conditions (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) can be
done conditioned on the value of Xm separately. Since the demographic characteristics vk
are also discrete, the most general utility function of (3.1) under discrete vk and X can be
re-written as
uijkm = α
k
j (l) if (x
m
j )
J
j=1 = x(l),
where αkj (l) is the mean utility3 of product j for a demographic group k individual in a
market with characteristics x(l). Any parametric assumption on the utility u1 and u2 in
(3.1) can be imposed as constraints on the value of αkj (l).
Even if νk is distributed on K discrete points, the random vector Dm is continuously
distributed. Moment conditions (3.8), (3.9) are still conditioned on Dm and we need to
transform them into unconditional moment conditions. Moment condition (3.8) is linear
in the elements of Dm and the optimal instrument will be dm1 , ..., dmk , and we can define
P0,kj (x(l)) as P0,kj (l). For moment condition (3.9), we can use Dm and its second order
power terms {(dmj )t : j = 1, ...J, t = 1, 2} as instruments to form unconditional moment
conditions.
Let α denote the vector of {αkj (l)}j,k,l and P denote the vector of {P0,kj (l)}j,k,l. Let
γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P) denote the moment unconditional conditions. The standard GMM
estimator of (α,P) is given by
(αˆ, Pˆ) = arg min[
1
M
M∑
m=1
γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)]′Wˆ [
1
M
M∑
m=1
γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)], (4.1)
3The utility parameter β cannot be separated from αkj (l), so I normalize u1 ≡ 0 for all j.
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whereM is the number of markets without the persuader, and Wˆ is any positive semi-definite
weighting matrix. Standard asymptotic normality results4 on the GMM estimator can be
applied if the moment condition satisfies some regularity conditions.
Assumption 4.2. Suppose the following conditions hold: (i).The true parameter value
(α0,P0) lies in the interior of the parameter space; (ii). γ(msm, Dm,Xm, ·, ·) is con-
tinuously differentiable on the interior of the parameter space for (msm, Dm,Xm); (iii).
γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α0,P0) has finite second moment; (iv) E[|∇(α,P)γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α0,P)0]
has rank dim((α,P)); (v). There exists a integrable function b such that
∣∣∇(α,P)γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)∣∣ < b(msm, Dm,Xm).
Conditions (i), (iii) and (iv) are assumptions on the true value of the parameter of interest
(α0,P0), which are not verifiable without observing the data distribution. Conditions (ii)
and (v) are assumptions on the derivatives of the moment conditions. It is difficult to verify
(ii) and (v) because δm∗ as a function of α and P is defined through the contraction mapping
(3.6). General primitive conditions on the rational inattention model to guarantee that δm∗ is
continuously differentiable in α,P are hard to find. However, when there is no demographic
heterogeneity, the δm∗ in Lemma 3.1 has a closed from solution (3.16). In this case, the
moment conditions (3.9) and (3.10) can be rewritten as
E
[(
log
msmj
msmJ
− log P
0
j (x(l))
P0J(x(l))
− αj(l)
)
1(Xm = x(l))
]
= 0,
E
[ msmjmsmJ /P0j (x(l))P0J (x(l))∑
l∈J P0,kl (X)
[
msmj
msmJ
/
P0j (x(l))
P0J (x(l))
] − 1
1(Xm = x(l))] = 0.
If there exists a constant C > 0 such that P0j (x(l)) > 1/C holds for all j, l, then conditions
(ii) and (iv) holds.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose assumption 4.2 holds. Denote B0 = E[∇α,Pγ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)].
Then
√
M [(αˆ, Pˆ)− (α0,P0)→d N(0,Σ),
4For example, see Theorem 3.4 of Newey and McFadden (1994).
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where Σ = (B′0WB0)−1B′0WΛWB′0(B′0WB0)−1, and
Λ = E[γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)γ(msm, Dm,Xm,α,P)′].
Recall that the moment condition for persuasion strategy in (3.14) is derived for each
identified value of (α, β,G). Now I give an estimator of the persuasion strategy when the
estimated (αˆ, Pˆ) in Lemma 4.1 are directly plugged into (3.14). This is a two-step estimation
procedure and will not be efficient. I will discuss the complexity of the joint estimation of
moment conditions 3.8-3.10 and (3.14) after the plug-in estimator of the persuasion strategy
is introduced.
Given the estimated (αˆ, Pˆ), we can construct a sample of estimated realized utility
vˆmj,k(x(l)) =
L∑
l=1
[
δj(ms
m,Xm, Dm, αˆ, Pˆ0) + αˆkj (X
m)
]
1(Xm = x(l)) (4.2)
corresponding to (3.2) and a sample of utility shock
ˆmj = δj(ms
m,Xm, Dm, αˆ, Pˆ0). (4.3)
Fixing the demographic group k and the characteristics x(l), the distribution of vˆmj,k(x(l))
conditioned on k and x(l) is an estimated distribution of realized utility.
To form moment condition (3.14), we first need the unconditional choice probability
P˜ 0,kj,s (X
m) in (3.13) for each demographic group k and for each product characteristics. To get
an estimator of P˜ 0,kj,s (Xm), denoted by Pˆ0,kj,s (Xm), we need to solve optimization problem (2.10)
with an estimated prior belief. I look at the empirical counterparts of optimization problem
(2.10) under persuasion strategy F˜ (sID, ; θ) conditioned on markets with Xm = x(l):
1∑M(x(l))
m′=1 F˜
k(sID = s|ˆm′j ; θ)
max
{P˜0,kj,s }Jj=1
M(x(l))∑
m=1
log(
J∑
j=1
P˜0,kj,s (x(l))evˆ
m
j )× F˜ k(sID = s|ˆmj ; θ)
s.t. ∀j : P˜0,kj,s (x(l)) ≥ 0,
J∑
j=1
P˜0,kj,s (x(l)) = 1,
(4.4)
where M(x(l)) is the number of markets such that Xm = x(l). I implicitly imposed that
the marginal distribution of F˜ k(mj ) is the empirical distribution of ˆm, and by Bayes’ rule
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F˜k(sID|ˆmj ;θ)∑M
m′=1 F˜
k(sID|ˆm′j ;θ)
is the posterior belief when the DM receive a signal s. Let Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l)) be
the solution to (4.4), and denoted the vector (Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l)))j,k,s,l as Pˆs.
After solving Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l)), we can now write the empirical version of moment condition
(3.14). Let N be the number of markets with persuasion. Denote ∀l = 0, ...L and ∀j =
1, ...J − 1:
gl,j,k(θ, m˜s
m, Dm,Xm, Pˆs) = [m˜s
m
j −
K∑
d=1
hdj (θ, Pˆs,x(l))d
m
k ]d
m
k 1(X
m = x(l)), (4.5)
hkj (θ, Pˆs,x(l)) =
∑
s
[
Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l), θ)
N(x(l))∑
m=1
F˜ (s|m; θ)
N(x(l))
]
(4.6)
where m˜sm is a vector of share observation in market m, and N(x(l)) is the number of
markets with persuasion such that Xm = x(l). Then we can estimate θ by the usual GMM
estimator:
θˆ = arg min(
1
N
N∑
m=1
gm(θ))′W2(
1
N
N∑
m=1
gm(θ)), (4.7)
where gm(θ)) is the vector of moment functions (gl,j)l,j in (4.5).
In what follows, I derive the consistency of θˆ when the persuasion strategy has a smooth
parametric form F˜ (sID,; θ) and the signal sID is discrete.
Assumption 4.3. The persuasion strategy satisfies that ∃ C > 0 for all s value:
1. F˜ (s|; θ) is differentiable with respect to , and the gradient is uniformly bounded in θ:
sup
θ∈Θ,s
∣∣∣∣∣∂F˜ (s|; θ)∂j
∣∣∣∣∣ < C;
2. The δ∗m(msm, Dm,Xm;α, (P0,kj (Xm))j,k) defined in Lemma 3.1 satisfies
|∂δ
∗m
j
∂κ
| < C ∀κ ∈ {αkj (l), (P0,kj (x(l)) : j, k, l}
for all values of msm, Dm,Xm.
3. The partial derivatives with respect to the elements of θ satisfy
sup
,s,i
∣∣∣∣∣∂F˜ (s|; θ)∂θi
∣∣∣∣∣ < C.
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The following condition imposes that the instruments Z(Dm) point identify the parameter
θ. The point identification conditions are discussed in section 3.
Assumption 4.4. Let g(θ) =
(
gl,j(θ, m˜s
m, Dm,Xm, Pˆs)
)l=1,...,L
j=1,...,J−1
, and define L(θ) = g(θ)′W2g(θ).
The following identification condition hold for all ζ > 0
sup
d(θ,θ0)>ζ
L(θ)− L(θ0) > 0.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions 4.2 -4.4, and technical assumption C.1, θˆ is a consistent
estimator of θ0.
Remark 4.1. The asymptotic distribution of θˆ is not derived in this paper. There are two
difficulties in deriving the asymptotic distribution of θ. The unconditional choice probability
vector under persuasion Pˆs is estimated using the sample of markets without persuasion. The
sampling error of Pˆs comes from two aspects: (i) Pˆs is estimated from the empirical version
(4.4) of the optimization problem (2.10); (ii) the utility shocks in (4.4) are constructed from
the estimator αˆ. Another difficulty comes from the fact that P0,sj,k (x(l)) can be local to the
boundary to the parameter space under the true persuasion strategy, i.e. P0,sj,k (x(l)) ≈ 1√n for
some (j, k, l). In this case, the sampling distribution of Pˆ0,sj,k (x(l)) is hard to derive and the
influence of the sampling error on θˆ is hard to derive.
Joint Estimation and Two Step Estimation
In this section, I briefly discuss how to estimate the persuasion strategy parameter θ and
preference parameters (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}, G) jointly using moment conditions (3.8)-(3.10) and
(3.14). The objective function of joint GMM estimation is just the simple stack of γm in (4.1)
and gm in (4.7). For each (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}, θ) in the parameter space, we need to find the δ∗m
for each market, and construct the pseudo sample of {m}Mm=1. Given the pseudo sample of
{m}Mm=1, we then solve the optimization problem (4.4) to get hkj in (4.6). Given m and hkj ,
we can evaluate the value of the joint GMM objective function at this (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}, θ).
The joint GMM estimation procedure introduces two extra computational burden com-
pared with the two step estimation procedure. First, the fixed point δ∗m needs to calculated
at each (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}j,k,lθ) parameter evaluation in the joint estimation. In contrast, in
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the two-step estimation, we find the fixed point for each (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l). If the di-
mension of θ is large, the extra parameter θ can introduce significant computational bur-
den to the joint estimation. Second, the optimization problem (4.4) needs to be solved
at each (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l, θ) in the joint estimation. In contrast, we plug the estimator
(αˆ, {Pˆ0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l) into (3.14), and the optimization problem (4.4) only needs to be solved
for each θ. Plugging in the estimator (αˆ, {Pˆ0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l) reduces the dimension of the
parameter space for the second step GMM estimation.
Joint estimation of (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l, θ) also makes the inference of (α, {P0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l)
difficult. The discussion under Proposition 4 reveals the difficulty of deriving the asymptotic
distribution of θˆ. The difficulty comes from the unknown limit distribution of Pˆ0,sj,k (x(l))
when P0,sj,k (x(l)) is local to zero. The same issue will happen to (αˆ, {Pˆ0j,k(x(l))}j,k,l) if we
estimate all moment conditions jointly.
5 Application: Fox News and the 2000 Presidential Elec-
tion
In this section, I apply the rational inattention, discrete choice model, with persuasion to
the effect of Fox News on the 2000 presidential election (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).
Fox News started the distribution of its channel in 1996 and its twenty-four-hour cable
program penetrated about 20% of the towns in the United States by Nov, 2000. Fox News
channel is perceived to provide political views that are right to the mainstream news channel
such as ABC and CNN. In the empirical application, I treat the entry of Fox News into
the local cable markets as the presence of the persuader. The DMs’ prior distribution G
is understood as the prior belief on the presidential candidates under mainstream news
channels. The goal is to estimate the preference parameters of each demographic group
and the persuasion strategy used by Fox News in these markets. The estimated persuasion
strategy can reveal the degree of bias in Fox News program.
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5.1 Data
The election outcome data are taken from DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and the demo-
graphic data are a mixture of the original demographic data in DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007) and the 2000 U.S. census data5. Each observation consists of a vector of presidential
election vote results and a vector of demographic statistics that correspond to a town and an
indicator for the presence of Fox News. The presidential election vote result includes the to-
tal votes cast, the number of votes for the Democratic Party, and the number of votes for the
Republican Party. The demographic statistics include the number of people that are above
18 years old, the gender ratio, the ethnic group decomposition (African American, Hispanic,
Asian, etc), and the decomposition by education level. The education level statistics are for
eligible voters (18+ years old), but ethnic group statistics incorporate both the adults and
children.
The original demographic data in Vigna and Kaplan is flawed. In about 15% of the
towns, the number of votes cast is more than the number of residents above 18 years old.
The issue happens when the town name corresponds to multiple administrative levels. For
example, there are some names used for two different townships and cities but in different
counties, their match tends to get wrong. I re-match the voting data with the 2000 U.S.
census data to deal with this issue but the problem is not solved completely. There are still
about 5% of the towns that have the inconsistency of votes and adults. As mentioned in
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), this may be due to flaws in the process of collecting the
election data.
I follow the data selection procedure in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) to discard towns:
1. without CNN news channel; 2. the number of precincts in 2000 differs from that in 1996
by 20%; 3. the total number of votes in 2000 differs from that in 1996 by 100%; 4. with
multiple cabal systems; 5. the number of people with high school and above is more than
the number of adults; 6. the number of votes is greater than the number of adults.
Throughout the application, I assume the choice set includes J = 3 options: {Rep,Dem,Out}.
5 The education level variable in their data set is not correct for some towns. For example, the proportion
of residents with no more than high school education and the proportion of residents with more than high
school education sum to greater than 1.
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All votes not cast for the two major parties candidates or adults not registered to vote are
grouped into the Out option.
5.2 Market Assumptions and Justification
First I separate markets into two groups: with persuasion and without persuasion. If Fox
News is available in the town, I assume the town is under the influence of the persuader.
This assumes that the presence of Fox News influences the whole town. Since I only use
observation of towns with one unique cable company, if the cable company includes Fox News,
everyone in the town should have access to the channel. While some residents may not watch
the channel, the contents of the news program can be spread through workplaces and places
of entertainment. This also assumes that towns without Fox News cannot be influenced by
persuasion. This assumption suits the historical context in 2000 where the fixed broadband
subscription in the United States accounts for around 2.5% of the population, so streaming
of Fox News is not accessible to major voters in the towns without Fox News.
The key assumption on market without persuasion is the assumption 3.2. The i.i.d
assumption on m assumes that there is no spatial correlation conditioned on the observed
characteristics in the town. This variation in m may come from the geographic location
differences of towns and the composition of industries in towns. For example, a policy of
cleaner fuel may generate different perceptions in the coal mining towns and forest zone.
The independence assumption m ⊥ Dm assumes the composition of demographics does not
influence the prior belief.
For markets with persuasion, assumption 3.3 requires that Fox News use the same per-
suasion strategy for all towns, regardless of the demographic composition. This assumption
is justified because Fox News is a national program, so the perception of persuasion strategy
should be similar for all towns6. Last, the assumption that the persuader draw persuasion
6Note that this is not a restriction on the entry decision. In fact, Fox News can endogenously choose the
town they wanted to provide channels but this is out of the scope of this paper. The model aims to estimate
the persuasion strategy used by Fox News but does not model its utility to justify the persuasion and the
entry. As long as the persuasion strategy is the same for all towns, the identification argument goes through
whether the entry was chosen optimally or exogenous.
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signal sID ∼i.i.d F˜ k says that the signals should be independent for all towns. This assump-
tion is hard to justify since Fox News is a national program. However, Fox News reports
on different aspects of the candidates (e.g. foreign policy, economic policy), and each town
may only focus on one aspect of a candidate, which may result in an i.i.d persuasion signal
across towns.
5.3 The Specification
I assume there are no product characteristics across towns. The utility is umkj = αj,k + mj ,
where the parameters αj,k are the mean utility of candidate j that differ across demographic
group k. The utility for the outside option is normalized to be zero. I partition the decision
makers in each town based on their education level at the time of the election: { High School
and Lower, College Partial, College Complete}.7 The segment of education level can reflect
the differences in income levels and the political spectrum. The estimators and the 95%
confidence intervals are reported in table 1.
Table 1: Estimated Mean Preference Parameters
Choice j α
High School College Partial College Complete
Rep
-0.1318
[-0.1540,-0.1050]
0.1369
[0.0816,0.1848]
0.0306
[0.0079,0.0538]
Dem
-0.0859
[-0.0983,-0.0707]
0.1260
[0.0693,0.1725]
0.0702
[0.0529,0.0857]
The estimation result shows several interesting observations. First, the group with partial
college degree has a slightly lower preference for the Democratic Party than the Republican
Party. The partial college group includes eligible voters who earn degrees from community
college or technical colleges. So we see that both highly educated group and the least
7A finer partition of the demographics is desired, but the U.S. census data do not provide the joint
distribution of education with other demographic characteristics.
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educated group prefer the Democratic Party8, but the middle class seems to be indifferent
between these two parties. Second, the College Partial group has a higher willingness to vote.
However, this does not imply the College Partial group vote more to the Democratic Party
than those who complete college education. Table 2 reports the estimated unconditional
choice probability for each demographic group.
Table 2: Unconditional Choice Probability: With and Without Fox News
High School College Partial College Complete
No Fox With Fox No Fox With Fox No Fox With Fox
Rep 0.1998 0.1610 0.5082 0.5488 0.3031 0.3415
Dem 0.1891 0.2086 0.2925 0.2498 0.3974 0.3634
The result in table 2 cannot be generated by a random utility model with Logit shock.
By random utility model with Logit shock, we would predict that the College Partial
group vote more for the Democratic Party than College Complete group would do, because
αDem,College Partial > αDem,CollegeComplete. The estimated density of the prior distribution G is
given in Figure ??.
8Note that the confidence interval of αDem,k does not intersect with αRep,k for k ∈
{High school, College Complete}
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Figure 1
For the identification of persuasion, I use two different parametric persuasion strategies
that differ across the three demographic groups. This can be true if the news programs are
designed to target different demographic groups. I restrict the persuader to have only two
signals to send. A two-signal persuasion strategy is easy to interpret. A ‘+’ signal means ‘1
is good’ if it only conveys information on 1, and it means ‘1 is better than 2’ if it compares
the 1 with 2. A ‘-’ signal means the contrary. 9
The persuasion strategy of the high school education group is given by
PrF˜HS(S
ID = −|) =
1 if rep < demθ(rep−dem)2hs if rep ≥ dem,
and the persuasion strategy of the college partial and college complete group is given by
PrF˜College(S
ID = −|) =
0 if rep > dem1− θ(rep−dem)2hs if rep ≤ dem.
9 Two-signal persuasion strategy is also justified by Gitmez and Molavi (2018), where the politician in
their model has full control of the news media and voters are heterogeneous in their belief.
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I use the same parametric family for demographic group with education higher than high
school but treat the least educated group separately. This is because table 2 shows that only
the least educated group has decreased unconditional choice probability for the Republican
Party and increased unconditional choice probability for the Democratic Party after Fox
News entered into their towns.
The ‘-’ signal in the persuasion strategy for the high school group can either mean when
the Republican party is indeed worse than the Democratic party, or it can mean with a small
probability that the Republican party is better.
The persuasion strategy for the eligible voters with at least a partial college education
has a better interpretation. The positive signal SID = + can be read as ‘the Republican is
better than the Democratic’. A positive signal is always sent when the Republican is indeed
better, i.e. rep > dem, and a fake positive signal can also be sent when rep < dem, but the
probability decays as the difference becomes larger in absolute value.
The estimated persuasion strategy parameters are reported in table 3, and I plot the
probability of the "+" signal for the two persuasion strategies in figure 2. We should note
that the persuasion strategy parameter θ is very close to 1 and the entropy of the marginal
distribution of the signal is close to zero. The close-to-zero entropy indicates that the signal
sent by Fox News does not carry much information. However, the relative scale of entropy
is still significantly large compared with the utility parameter αjk for all three groups.
Table 3: Persuasion Strategy
High School College Partial and Complete
Estimator θˆ 0.9620 0.9452
Entropy 0.0553 0.0378
Note: The entropy numbers are calculated based on the marginal distribution of signal.
The overall fit of the persuasion model can be seen from the difference between the
data unconditional choice probability and the unconditional choice probability predicted by
the persuasion strategy. Table 4 shows that the model predicts the unconditional choice
probability quite well except for the high school group’s unconditional choice probability of
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Figure 2: Estimated Probability of Sending "+" Signal and the histogram of rep − dem
choosing the Republican party.
Table 4: Unconditional Choice Probability in Towns with Fox News: Model vs Data
High School College Partial College Complete
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Rep 0.1853 0.1610 0.5427 0.5488 0.3335 0.3415
Dem 0.2090 0.2086 0.2614 0.2498 0.3708 0.3634
5.4 Welfare Analysis
Costly information acquisition can lead the decision maker to choose the second-best choice
with some probability. If information is free (i.e.λ = 0, or decision maker can perfectly
observe (rep, dem)), the decision maker should be able to choose the one that maximizes
34
his utility. This is defined as the first-best outcome. Persuasion signal has two influences
on decision makers: persuasion signal provides extra information that reduce the entropy
of belief, but it also intentionally leads some decision makers to make wrong decisions. In
this section, I analyze the welfare by asking what is the percentage of voters that cast votes
consistent with their first best choice before and after Fox News enters into their town.
Formally, the first best choice jm,fbk in a town m is defined as
jm,fbk = arg max
j∈J
αj,k + 
m
j
and Pk
j=jfb
(α + m) is the proportion of voters that make the correct choice in the rational
inattention model without persuasion in town m, and
∑
s F˜ (s|))Pkj=jfb,s(α + m) is the
proportion of voters that make the correct choice with Fox News Persuasion. Since we have
the estimated prior distribution G(rep, dem), we get the distribution of Pkj=jfb(α+ m) and∑
s F˜ (s|))Pkj=jfb,s(α+m). The estimated distribution (across towns) can be seen in figure 3.
The patterns are quite different for the three groups. For voters with high school education,
persuasion does not really help them to make better decisions overall. For voters with a
partial college education, persuasion generates higher dispersion in the distribution of voters
that vote for their first best choice. It should be noted that even if the persuasion strategy is
the same for voters with a partial and full college education, the persuasion strategy tightens
the distribution of the first best choice for voters who complete a college education.
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Figure 3: Distribution of percentage of voters that achieve their first best choice
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the identification of the rational inattention discrete choice model with
Bayesian Persuasion. I derive the conditional moment conditions that identify the mean
utility of each product and prior distribution. I also show the identification of a parametric
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persuasion strategy when the persuader plays a sequential game with decision makers in the
model. In the empirical application, I studied the effect of Fox News in persuading voters to
vote for the Republican Party. I also analyze the welfare change for voters before and after
the influence of Fox News.
For future research, we should derive a method to unify the supply-side model with the
identified persuasion strategy. If the supply side, which is Fox News in the context, is rational
when it chooses the persuasion strategy, the optimal strategy should reveal constraints on its
utility parameters. Such parameters are crucial when we conduct a counterfactual analysis
on the supply side. For instance, in the IO context, the preference for persuasion strategy
would allow us to model the non-price competition.
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A Appendix 1: Data Compression Interpretation of En-
tropy Cost
The entropy of a discrete random variable is closely related to the expected number of binary
questions needed to be asked to determine the realization. Consider the following example:
• X is supported on 4 points: X1 = (H,H), X2 = (H,L), X3 = (L,H) and X4 = (L,L).
• The probability of each realization is P1 = P4 = 1/3 and P2 = P3 = 1/6.
• Consider two ways of asking questions:
1. Q1: The state is: (A) First component is H; (B) the First component is L. Q2:
(A) Second component is H; (B) the Second component is L.
2. Q1: The state is: (A) Both high; (B) Both low; (C) Neither. Q2: The state is:
(A) (H,L); (B) (L,L).
Using the first approach, we need to ask two binary questions for sure to pin down the
realization. Using the second approach we are expected to ask one 3-adic question for sure,
and with 1/3 probability we need another binary question. If we consider that a 3-adic
question is equivalent to log2 3 binary questions 10, the expected number of binary question
we need to ask is log2 3 + 1/3 = −2/3 × log2(1/3) + 1/3 × log2(1/6) which is the entropy
number. In many examples, the entropy number cannot be coded with an integer number
of binary questions, but nonetheless the entropy number is a good approximation for the
complexity of the random variable.
Now, consider the entropy cost function we defined in (2.5). The entropy H(G) is inter-
preted as the number of binary questions of the prior distribution. Now, given the signal
s the DM acquire from the world, the number of binary questions is reduced to H(F (·|s)).
10One way to understand this conversion is the following. Suppose we have N binary questions that can
cover all possible states of the world, the cardinality of states of the world is approximately 2N . In the
same case, suppose we need M 3-adic question to cover all states of the world. By setting 2N ≈ 3M , we
find the N = M ∗ log23. The more rigorous conversion argument can be established using large scale data
compression theory. See Cover (2006), Chapter 5.
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Since ex ante, the DM do not know the realization of s, the expected number of questions
remained is Es[H(F (·|s))]. Therefore, the difference of entropy H(G) − Es[H(F (·|s))] is
interpreted as the expected number of binary questions that is answered by the signal s,
and the unit cost of information λ = 0 is interpreted as the market price for asking a binary
question.
The interpretation still works when we consider s being discrete but the state v is con-
tinuous. Let’s consider an example where X ∼ U [−1, 1] and Y = 1 when X ≥ 0 and Y = 0
when X < 0. Given X is negative with probability 0.5, Y answers one binary question
whether X is negative or not. Direct calculation shows that H(X) = 1 and H(X|Y ) = 0, so
the mutual information I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = 1.
When the pair (s,v) is continuously distributed, the data compression argument needs
to be modified slightly. The approach is to take a quantization of the random variable. The
quantization of v is to slice the support of v with cubes of side length ∆. As the quantization
length ∆→ 0, the entropy of the discrete random vector, denoted as V (δ), will converge to
the differential entropy of v in the following sense:
H(V (δ)) + log ∆J → H(G(v)) as ∆→ 0
where J is the dimension of v. We can perform the same quantization for the signal variable
s. When we calculate the entropy difference H(G) − Es[H(F (·|s))], which is called the
mutual information, the effect of quantization will disappear. See Cover and Thomas(2006),
Chapter 8 for discussion of quantization. Then we can use the interpretation for the data
compression on the quantized version of (v, s).
B Appendix 2: Proofs of Section 3
B.1 The Contraction Mapping Lemma 3.1
Proof. The proof is a minor adaption of Berry et al. (1995). To show the operator T is a
contraction mapping, it suffice to show that the conditions of theorem 1 in BLP holds. Let
Tj : R
J−1 → R denote the j − th component of the mapping T : RJ−1 → RJ−1 defined in
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(3.6). I use the following notation for the proof:
Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α) =
P0,kj (X)eδj+u2(Xm,νk,α)∑
l∈J P0,kl (X)eδl+u2(Xm,νk,α)
. (B.1)
First note that:
∂Tj
∂δj
= 1− 1
ms∗j
×
∑
k
Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α)× (1− Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α))dk
≥ 1− 1
ms∗j
×
∑
k
Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α)dk ≥ 0
∂Tj
∂δl
=
1
ms∗j
×
∑
k
Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α)Pkl (δl,X,P0,k, νk, α)dk ≥ 0
and for any j = 1, ..., J − 1:
∑
l<J
∂Tj
∂δl
= 1− 1
ms∗j
×
∑
k
[
Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α)× (1−
J−1∑
l=1
Pkl (δl,X,P0,k, νk, α))dk
]
= 1− 1
ms∗j
×
∑
k
[Pkj (δ,X,P0,k, νk, α)× PkJ (δJ ,X,P0,k, νk, α)dk] ,
where ms∗j ≡ ms∗j(Xm, δm, α,Dm, {P0,kj (X)}j,k). For the outside option J , δJ = 0 holds
because we assume the choice utility of the outside option is zero by normalization. By
assumption, the unconditional choice probability of the outside option is non-zero for all X
and all k, i.e. P0,kl (X) > 0. The Logit form (B.1) implies the conditional choice probability
PkJ (δJ ,X,P0,k, νk, α) > 0 must hold, which further implies:
J−1∑
l=1
∂Tj
∂δl
< 1.
This verifies the condition 1 of the contraction mapping theorem in Appendix 1 of BLP.
To verify condition 2 of the contraction mapping theorem in BLP, I rewrite equation
(3.6) by plug in the expression of ms∗j into the mapping T :
[T (δ)]j = log(ms
m
j )− log
(∑
k
P0,kj eu2(X
m
j ,νk,α)
P0,kJ +
∑J−1
l=1 P0,kl eδl+u2(xl,νk,α)
dk
)
The function T is bounded from below by log(msmj )− log
(∑
k
P0,kj e
u2(X
m
j ,νk,α)
P0,kJ
dk
)
when δj →
−∞.
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For condition 3 of the contraction mapping theorem in BLP, for any j, I set δ¯j:
δ¯j = arg min
δj
[
msmJ −
∑
k
P0,kJ (X)
P0,kJ (X) + P0,kj (X)eδj+u2(X
m
j ,νk,α)
dk
]2
which is the solution of δj to match the market share of the outside option when δk = −∞
for all k 6= j.
Remark B.1. The extra condition that the outside option is chosen with positive uncondi-
tional choice probability is not required in the proof of Berry et al. (1995), because when the
shock is supported on unbounded space, the outside option will always have a positive choice
probability. The last step is also slightly different from Berry (1994) where the unconditional
choice probability P0,kj appears in the denominator.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since all three moment conditions are conditioned on Xm, and by assumption 3.2, the
product characteristics Xm is independent of the random utility shocks m and demographic
distribution vector Dm, I prove the proposition conditioned on the value of Xm and drop
Xm moment condition expressions whenever there is no confusion.
Constraint on P0,kj
For each market m, we observe only the market share vector
msm = (msm1 , ...ms
m
J )
′
and the demographic distribution
Dm = (dm1 , ...d
m
K)
where dmk is the share of people in demographic group k in market m. Then in market m,
the observation msm satisfies:
msmj =
K∑
k=1
Pkj (m)dmk ∀j = 1, ..., J.
42
If we take expectation with respect to theG distribution and the demographic distribution
on both sides of the above equation, we have
EG[ms
m
j − (P1j (m), ...PKj (m))(dm1 , ...dmK)′|Dm] = 0
By assumption 3.2, (dm1 , ...dmK) ⊥ (m,Xm), we have
EG[Pkj (m)dmk |(dm1 , ...dmK)] = dmk EG[Pkj (m)] = dmk EG[P0,kj ].
Use the linearity of expectation we can rewrite the above equation as:
E[msmj − (P0,1j , ...P0,Kj )(dm1 , ...dmK)′|Dm] = 0.
This is the moment condition (3.8).
Independent  constraint
Lemma (3.6) establishes δm as a function of (α, β,P0,kj ). So we can write the  as the
difference of δ and u1. The moment condition (3.9) then comes directly from the assumption
that m ⊥ Dm in assumption (3.2).
Optimality constraint
Lastly, I derive the condition that is implied by the fact that P0,kj solves the optimization
problem (2.10). Since P0,kj uniformly bounded away from zero and one, so the first order
condition of (2.10) is ∫

eδ
m
j +u2(x
m
j ,νk,α)∑J
l=1P0,kl eδml +u2(xml ,νk,α)
dG() = 1.
Note that the optimization (2.10) is a convex optimization so the first order condition is
sufficient to characterize the solution. So the above first order condition can be transformed
into the condition:
E
[
eδj+u2(x
m
j ,νk,α)∑
l∈J P0,kl eδl+u2(xml ,νk,α)
− 1
]
= 0,
which is the moment condition (3.10).
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C Proofs of Proposition 4
Some Notations
Fix a θ and a persuasion strategy F˜ (sID, ; θ). Recall that I use Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l); θ) to denote
the estimated unconditional choice probability under persuasion signal s solved from (4.4)
and use Pˆs(θ) to denote the vector of all j, k, l, s. I use P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ) to denote the true
unconditional choice probability under persuasion solved from (2.10), and use P˜s(θ) to denote
the vector of all j, k, l, s. I use P0 to denote the true unconditioned choice probabilities
without persuasion that corresponds to the moment condition (3.8), and use Pˆ0 to denote
its estimator. I use G to denote the empirical distribution of ˆ and use G to denote the true
distribution of . I use Br(·) to denote a neighborhood of radius r near (·).
C.1 Some Lemmas
Assumption C.1. Fixing the index k, l, s, let
M({Pj}Jj=1, θ) =
∫

J∑
j=1
Pje
αkj (x(l))+j F˜ k(s|; θ)G().
The following condition hold: ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀κ > 0, there exists some ζ > 0 such that
sup
d((Pj)Jj=1,(P˜0,kj,s (x(l);θ))Jj=1)>κ
M({P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ)}Jj=1, θ)−M({Pj}Jj=1, θ) > ζ.
Lemma C.1. Fixing the index k, l, s. Let
Mn({Pj}Jj=1, θ) =
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
Pje
αkj,0(x(l))+
m
j F˜ k(s|m; θ)1(Xm = x(l)),
where M(x(l)) =
∑M
m=1 1(X
m = x(l)). Suppose assumptions in Proposition 4 hold, then
inf
θ∈Θ
[
Mn({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l); θ)}Jj=1, θ)− sup
(Pj)Jj=1∈∆J
Mn({Pj}Jj=1, θ)
]
= −op(1),
where ∆J−1 is the J dimensional probability simplex.
Remark C.1. The Mn differs from the objective function of (4.4) because the αkj,0(x(l)) is
the true value of α, while we use αˆ in (4.4). This Lemma shows that Pˆs(θ) is also the
op(1)-maximizer of Mn.
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Proof. Define
Mˆn({Pj}Jj=1, θ) =
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
Pje
αˆkj,0(x(l))+ˆ
m
j F˜ k(s|ˆm; θ)1(Xm = x(l)),
which is the objective function in (4.4), and {Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1 is the maximizer of the above
objective function in the simplex ∆J−1. Let {P ∗j (θ)}Jj=1 be the maximizer of Mn({Pj}Jj=1, θ),
then we have
Mˆn({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ) ≥ Mˆn({P ∗j (θ)}Jj=1, θ)
=
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)e
αˆkj,0(x(l))+ˆ
m
j F˜ k(s|ˆm; θ)1(Xm = x(l))
=
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (1)1(X
m = x(l))
(C.1)
where the function fmj is defined in the following:
fmj (t) = e
αkj,0(x(l))+t(αˆ
k
j,0(x(l))−αkj,0(x(l)))+mj +t(ˆmj −mj )F˜ k(s|m + t(ˆm − m); θ).
By mean value theorem, we can find a tmj ∈ [0, 1] such that fmj (1) = fmj (0) + (fmj )′(tmj ). The
derivatives with respect to t is
(fmj )
′(t) = fmj (t)
[
αˆkj,0(x(l))− αkj,0(x(l)) + ˆmj − mj
]
+ eα
k
j,0(x(l))+t(αˆ
k
j,0(x(l))−αkj,0(x(l)))+mj +t(ˆmj −mj )
J∑
i=1
∂F˜ k
∂i
(ˆmi − mi ).
(C.2)
Now I bound the term ˆmj − mj :
|(ˆmj − mj )| =
∣∣∣[δ∗j (msm, Dm,Xm, αˆ, Pˆ0)− δ∗j (msm, Dm,Xm,α,P0)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∑
j,k
∂δ∗mj
∂αkj (l)
(αˆkj (l)− αkj (l)) +
∑
j,k
∂δ∗mj
∂P0,kj (l)
(Pˆ0,kj (l)− P0,kj (l)
∣∣∣∣
≤ J ×K × C max
j,k
{
max{αˆkj (l)− αkj (l), Pˆ0,kj (l)− P0,kj (l)}
} (C.3)
where the inequality holds by Assumption 4.3. Moreover, by Assumption 4.3, ∂F˜k
∂i
< C
also holds. Now, denote the term maxj,k
{
max{αˆkj (l)− αkj (l), Pˆ0,kj (l)− P0,kj (l)}
}
by o∗α,P ,
combining (C.2) and (C.3), we have
|(fmj )′(t)| ≤ 2J2KC2eα
k
j,0(x(l))+t(αˆ
k
j,0(x(l))−αkj,0(x(l)))+mj +t(ˆmj −mj ) × o∗α,P .
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Now we substitute the mean value expansion of fmj (1) back to (C.1) to get
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (1)1(X
m = x(l))
=
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (0)1(X
m = x(l))
+
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)(f
m
j )
′(tmj )1(X
m = x(l))
≥ 1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (0)1(X
m = x(l))
− 2J2KC2|o∗α,P |
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)e
αkj,0(x(l))+t(αˆ
k
j,0(x(l))−αkj,0(x(l)))+mj +t(ˆmj −mj )1(Xm = x(l))
By Lemma 4.1, |o∗α,P | = op(1) and
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)e
αkj,0(x(l))+t(αˆ
k
j,0(x(l))−αkj,0(x(l)))+mj +t(ˆmj −mj )1(Xm = x(l))
→p E
[
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)e
αkj,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
]
≤ E
[
J∑
j=1
eα
k
j,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
]
,
where the last inequality holds because P ∗j (θ) ≤ 1. The observation is that
E
[
J∑
j=1
eα
k
j,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
]
is independent of the parameter θ.
1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (1)1(X
m = x(l))
≥ 1
M(x(l))
M(x(l))∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
P ∗j (θ)f
m
j (0)1(X
m = x(l))− op(1)
= sup
(Pj)Jj=1∈∆J
Mn({Pj}Jj=1, θ)− op(1),
where the last equality holds by definition ofMn({Pj}Jj=1, θ) and {P ∗j (θ)}Jj=1 is the maximizer
ofMn({Pj}Jj=1, θ). In particular, the op(1) term 2J2KC2|o∗α,P |E
[∑J
j=1 e
αkj,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
]
is independent of θ, so the result in the Lemma follows.
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Lemma C.2. supθ∈Θ,(Pj)Jj=1∈∆J |Mn({Pj}Jj=1, θ)−M({Pj}Jj=1, θ)| = op(1)
Proof. Let ((Pj)Jj=1, θ) and ((P¯j)Jj=1, θ¯) be two values in the set Θ×∆J .∣∣∣∣∣
J∑
j=1
Pje
αkj,0(x(l))+
m
j F˜ k(s|m; θ)1(Xm = x(l))−
J∑
j=1
P¯je
αkj,0(x(l))+
m
j F˜ k(s|m; θ¯)1(Xm = x(l))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤(1)
dim(θ)∑
i=1
(θ¯i − θi)∂F˜
k
∂θi
+ sup
j
|Pj − P¯j|
 J∑
j=1
eα
k
j,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
≤(2) C × dim(θ)||(P¯j)Jj=1, θ¯)− (Pj)Jj=1, θ)||∞
J∑
j=1
eα
k
j,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
≤ C × C1 × dim(θ)||(P¯j)Jj=1, θ¯)− (Pj)Jj=1, θ)||∞
J∑
j=1
eα
k
j,0(x(l))+
m
j 1(Xm = x(l))
where || · ||∞ is the sup norm on a vector, and C1 is a constant such that || · ||∞ ≤ || · ||2
11. Inequality (1) follows by mean value theorem and inequality (2) follows by Assumption
4.3. Then by Theorem 2.7.11 in Wellner and van der Vaart (2013), we have the uniform
convergence.
Lemma C.3. If Condition C.1 holds, then supθ∈Θ |Pˆs(θ)− P˜0s(θ)| = op(1)
Proof. Lemma C.1 and C.2 implies that
sup
θ∈Θ
|Mn({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)−M({P˜0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)| = op(1).
So we have
sup
θ
M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)−M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)
≤ sup
θ
M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)−Mn({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ) + op(1) = op(1),
where the last equality hold by Lemma C.2. By assumption C.1, the event
d
(
(Pj)
J
j=1, (P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ))Jj=1
)
> κ
is contained in the event supθM({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)−M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ) > κ, therefore
Pr
(
d
(
(Pj)
J
j=1, (P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ))Jj=1
)
> κ
)
< Pr(sup
θ
M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ)−M({Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l))}Jj=1, θ) > κ)→ 0
. The result follows by taking the union over finite index k = 1, ..., K and l = 1, ..., L.
11Such C1 can always be found because all norms of a finite dimensional vector space are equivalent.
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Lemma C.4. Let Fk(s|θ) ≡ 1
M
∑M
m=1 F˜
k(s|ˆm; θ) and let F˜ k(s|θ) ≡ ∫ F˜ k(s|; θ)dG(). The
following hold under assumption 4.3 supθ∈Θ |F˜k(s|θ)− F˜ (s|θ)| = op(1).
Proof. We look at the following expansion∣∣∣F˜k(s|θ)− F˜ (s|θ)∣∣∣ = 1
M
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
m=1
F˜ (s|ˆm; θ)− F˜ (s|m; θ) + F˜ (s|m; θ)− E(F˜ (s|m; θ))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
∂F˜
∂j
(ˆmj − mj )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
[F˜ (s|m; θ)− E(F˜ (s|m; θ))]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ C
M
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
(ˆmj − mj )
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
[F˜ (s|m; θ)− E(F˜ (s|m; θ))]
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(C.4)
where the last inequality holds by assumption 4.3. Now we use the expansion of mj in (C.3)
to get∣∣∣∣∣ CM
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
(ˆmj − mj )
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ JKC2
∣∣∣∣maxj,k {max{αˆkj (l)− αkj (l), Pˆ0,kj (l)− P0,kj (l)}}
∣∣∣∣ = op(1)
Note that F (s|m; θ) is a Donsker class indexed by θ by assumption 4.3, which implies
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
m=1
[F˜ (s|m; θ)− E(F˜ (s|m; θ))]
∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1).
Combined the two terms in (C.4) we can get supθ |F˜k(s|θ)− F˜ k(s|θ)) = op(1).
Lemma C.5. supθ∈Θ,j=1,...J,k=1,...K,l=1,...L |Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l); θ)F˜k(s|θ)−P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ)F˜ k(s|θ)| = op(1).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma C.3 and C.4.
Lemma C.6. Consider
g∗l,j,k(θ, m˜s
m, Dm,Xm, P˜s) = [m˜s
m
j −
K∑
d=1
h∗kj (θ, P˜s,x(l))d
m
k ]d
m
k 1(X
m = x(l)), (C.5)
h∗kj (θ, P˜s,x(l)) =
∑
s
[
P˜0,kj,s (x(l), θ)F˜ k(s|θ)
]
. (C.6)
The equation (C.5) and (C.6) differ from (4.5) and (4.6) because (C.5) and (C.6) use the
true unconditional choice probability instead of the estimator. Define
Ln(θ) =
(
1
N
N∑
m=1
g∗(θ)
)′
W
(
1
N
N∑
m=1
g∗(θ)
)
,
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where g∗(θ) collects g∗l,j for all l, j, k indices. Then θˆ is an op(1) minimizer of Ln(θ), i.e.
Ln(θˆ) ≤ minθ Ln(θ) + op(1).
Proof. Note that θˆ = arg min Lˆn(θ), where Lˆn(θ) is the objective function of (4.7).
I first denote ∆l,j,k(θ) = g∗l,j,k(θ, m˜s
m, Dm,Xm, P˜s) − gl,j,k(θ, m˜sm, Dm,Xm, Pˆs), where
gl,j is defined in (4.5). Using the expression of g∗l,j,k and gl,j,k, we have
sup
θ∈Θ
|∆l,j,k(θ)| ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
d=1
∑
s
(
Pˆ0,kj,s (x(l); θ)F˜k(s|θ)− P˜0,kj,s (x(l); θ)F˜ k(s|θ)
)
1(Xm = x(l))
∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1).
(C.7)
The difference Ln(θ) − Lˆn(θ) = ∆(θ)′W∆(θ), where ∆(θ) = (∆l,j(θ))l,j. Then by (C.7),
supθ |Ln(θ)− Lˆn(θ)| ≤ ||∆(θ)||22 max eig(W ) = op(1).
Now I look at Ln(θˆ). Suppose we can find θ∗ such that Ln(θ∗) ≤ infθ∈Θ Ln(θ) + op(1)
Ln(θˆ) = Lˆn(θˆ) + Ln(θˆ)− Lˆn(θˆ)
≤(1) Lˆn(θ∗) + Ln(θˆ)− Lˆn(θˆ)
= Ln(θ
∗) + Ln(θˆ)− Lˆn(θˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
op(1)
−[Ln(θ∗)− Lˆn(θ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
op(1)
]
=(2) Ln(θ
∗) + op(1) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
Ln(θ) + op(1)
where inequality (1) holds by the definition of θˆ, and (2) equality holds because we have
shown supθ |Ln(θ)− Lˆn(θ)| ≤ ||∆(θ)||22 max eig(W ) = op(1).
Lemma C.7. Let L(θ) = E[g∗(θ)]′WE[g∗(θ)]. Then supθ∈Θ |Ln(θ)− L(θ)| = op(1)
Proof. Define the difference
∆∗l,j,k(θ) =
1
N
N∑
m=1
(
m˜smj 1(X
m = x(l))dmk − E[m˜smj 1(Xm = x(l))dmk ]
)
+
+
K∑
k′=1
(
1
N
N∑
m=1
dmk′1(X
m = x(l))dmk − E[dmk′1(Xm = x(l))dmk ]
)
P0,k1,s (θ)F˜ k(s|θ)
Observe that P0,k1,s (θ)F˜ k(s|θ) ∈ [0, 1] because it is the product of two probability quantities.
Moreover, the dmk ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we can bound ∆∗(θ), which is the vector of ∆∗l,j,k for
all l, j, k indices by
||∆∗(θ)||2 ≤ JKL
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
m=1
m˜smj − E[m˜smj ]
∣∣∣∣∣+ JK2Lmaxk,k′
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
m=1
dmk d
m
k′ − E[dmk dmk′ ]
∣∣∣∣∣ . (C.8)
49
The right hand side of (C.8) does not depend on θ. By apply weak law of large numbers to
the sample means of m˜smj and dmk dmk′ , we have supθ∈Θ ||∆∗(θ)||2 = op(1). Then notice that
L(θ)− Ln(θ) = ∆∗(θ)′W∆∗(θ), so we have
sup
θ∈Θ
|L(θ)− Ln(θ)| ≤ max eig(W )||∆∗(θ)||22 = op(1).
C.2 Main Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The consistency of θˆ follows by the identification assumption
sup
d(θ,θ0)>ζ
L(θ)− L(θ0) > 0
where θˆ is an op(1) minimizer of Ln by Lemma C.6. Moreover we have the uniform conver-
gence of supθ∈Θ |Ln(θ)−L(θ)| = op(1) by Lemma C.7. Conditions of Theorem 5.7 in Van der
Vaart (2000) are satisfied, so θˆ →p θ.
D Discussion of Computation
The estimators in the main text are constructed in two steps. While the joint estimation
of (α, β,P, θ) is possible, the computational burden is heavy. Markets with persuasion also
provide identification power to the first stage parameter (α, β,P), but this requires me to
use contraction mapping each time I search over a higher dimensional parameter space when
including θ. Also, the estimation of θ requires solving the empirical optimization problem
(4.4) for given first stage parameters. For the two-step estimation, I just plug in the first
stage estimator and solve the (4.4) for different values of θ, while for joint estimation the
optimization problem needs to be repeated for each guessed value of (α, β,P).
The computational burden also comes from the contraction mapping because I need to
iterate over M markets. So here I use the following trick to convert the M contraction
mappings to one single contraction mapping.
Proposition 5. Let Tm(δ) : Rd → Rd be a contraction mapping for each m = 1...M . Then
T ≡ (T 1, ..., TM) : RdM → RdM is a contraction mapping acting on (δ1, ..., δM).
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Proof. Let Cm < 1 be the contraction constant that |Tm(δ1)− Tm(δ2)| < Cm|δ1− δ2|. Then
C(M) = maxCm < 1 is the contraction constant for T .
The computational burden for this combined T can be potentially high because: 1. even
though iteration on matrix is faster than iteration over M markets, the iteration on matrix
is still slow when M is large; 2. the uniform contraction constant C(M) can be close to
one and number of iteration to achieve certain tolerance level may be large. The following
algorithm is helpful to reduce the running time:
• Set up a tolerance level tol and a threshold integer Kthr. Run the iteration on T , and
count the number of δm such that |T (δm)− δm| < tol, denote this number as Kcon.
• When Kcon > Kthr, collect the remaining markets index and construct the new con-
traction T ′ = {Tm}remain. Iterate until convergence.
• Multiple threshold to decide remaining markets can be set up to further boost the
speed.
This algorithm exploits the fact that the contraction mapping is simply the stacking of
individuals. The intuition is that if Cm ∈ {Csmall, C large}, and when the number of markets
falls into C large group is relatively small, the algorithm avoids the slow iteration on C large and
also avoid excessive iteration on markets with Csmall. This algorithm boost the computation
speed of contraction mapping by a factor of 10 in the empirical application.
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